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Moral Rights Protection in the United
States Under the Berne Convention: A
Fictional Work?
Natalie C. Suhl*
INTRODUCTION
The American market is an irresistible magnet for creators from
around the globe. Whether a creator’s medium is the written word,
oil paints, performance, or music, she wants to profit from the large
U.S. market. In recent years the Internet has significantly increased
entry points into the U.S. market. The lack of strong protection for
authors in the American legal tradition, however, presents significant
reasons for a creator to avoid entering the U.S. market.1
Although Continentals2 and Americans share a similar early
history of revolutionary independence, fundamental differences in
these revolutions established divergent legal traditions.3 In France,
the overthrow of the landed gentry from below led to the creation of
a new standard for the elite.4 Intellectual and creative prowess
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2002; B.A., College of Social
Studies, Wesleyan University, 1996. I would like to thank Professor Hugh Hansen for his
guidance on this project. Special thanks to Kevin Galbraith, Michael Hartmere, and Daniel
Branower for their thoughtful editing. I would also like to thank my parents for their
invaluable support. This is for my grandfather.
1
See infra Part III.
2
France will be the prototype for Continentals in this Comment.
3
See ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 138
(Stuart Gilbert trans., Anchor Books 1st ed. 1955) (de Toqueville notes that in
English/Anglo society men of letters, historically played a pivotal role in public life. In
contrast, the men of letters in France, the intellectuals, did not hold any recognized place in
French society until the late eighteenth century. “In a nation teeming with officials none of
the men of letters held posts of any kind, none was invested with authority.”).
4
See id. at 146-47. “Our men of letters did not merely impart their revolutionary ideas
to the French nation; they also shaped the national temperament and outlook on life. . . .
The result was that our writers ended up by giving the French man the instincts, the turn of
mind, the tastes, and even the eccentricities characteristic of the literary man. And when the
time came for action, these literary propensities were imported into the political [legal]
arena.”
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replaced acreage as the basis of power in the new regime.5 In
contrast, the American Revolution was not a revolution from below,
but rather an overthrow of an external governing authority by those
already in power. The power base in the United States was
multifaceted; it did not derive from one element such as the
educational elite or landed gentry, rather the government and
individuals gained power by meeting the diverse needs of a dynamic
and socially mobile society.6 American social construction served to
help expand commercial interests as the country prospered,
capitalizing upon its social and physical resources.7 In contrast to the
Continent, artistic pursuits were not perceived as adding any value to
the country’s well being, and thus were afforded minimal legal
protection.8
Part II of this note presents an overview of the Moral Rights
doctrine and discusses the historical and theoretical development of
the doctrine9 in Europe and under the Berne Convention. Part III
examines the regimes by which U.S. law protects Moral Rights and
supposedly complies with the Berne Convention. Part IV concludes
5

See id.
“In America most of the rich men were formerly poor; most of those who now enjoy
leisure were absorbed in business during their youth; the consequences of this is that when
they might have had a taste for study, they had no time for it, and when the time is at their
disposal, they have no longer the inclination.” 1 ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 52 (Phillips Bradley trans., Vintage Books 1st ed. 1990).
7
“In democratic countries, where money does not lead those who possess it to political
power, but often removes them from it, the rich do not know how to spend their leisure.
They are driven into active life by the disquietude and the greatness of their desires, by the
extent of their resources, and by the taste for what is extraordinary, which is almost always
felt by those who rise, by whatever means, above the crowd. Trade is the only road open to
them. In democracies nothing is greater or more brilliant than commerce. . . . Those who
live in the midst of democratic fluctuations have always before their eyes the image of
chance; and they end by liking all undertakings in which chance plays a part. They are
therefore all led to engage in commerce, not only for the sake of profit it holds out to them,
but for the love of the constant excitement occasioned by that pursuit.” 2 ALEXIS DE
TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 155-56 (Phillips Bradley trans., Vintage Books 1st
ed. 1990).
8
“Primary instruction is within the reach of everybody; superior instruction is scarcely
to be obtained by any. . . . There is no class, then, in America, in which the taste for
intellectual pleasure is transmitted with hereditary fortune and leisure and by which the
labors of intellect are held in honor.” See 1 DE TOQUEVILLE, supra note 6, at 52.
9
See infra note 12.
6
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that it is questionable if the U.S. is meeting its Moral Rights
obligations as a signatory to the Berne Convention.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Brief Overview
During the creation of a work an author maintains a connection to
the work; essentially, the creation is part of the author’s personality
until the work becomes subject to public judgment.10 The Moral
Rights of an author11 protect the connection between the creative
work and the author’s vested interest in the work both during and
after its creation.12 A work becomes subject to public judgment once
it enters the public domain, which occurs when the work is put up for
display or is published.13 In the public domain the work is subject to
the process of transactions.14 Although at this point the artist no
longer possesses the work, the Moral Rights doctrine provides the
author with a bundle of vested rights that nonetheless remain.15
In the most expansive form, Moral Rights provide the author with
the right to: 1) (attribution) have her name associated with all her
creations and no others; 2) (integrity) prevent mutilation, distortion
or alteration of the art; 3) (disclosure) choose if and when his work
will be revealed to the public; 4) (retraction or withdrawal) withdraw
10
See Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A
Comparison of Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 361, 365-66 (1998).
11
In this note ‘author’ refers to the creator of an artistic medium in any medium.
12
Many authoritative articles exist on the subject of Moral Rights. See Thomas F.
Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L.REV. 1 (1997); Jane C.
Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on the Visual Artists Rights Act
and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 477 (1990).
13
See Swack, supra note 10, at 365.
14
See id. (the work becomes the subject of transactions as it is bought and sold within
the commercial market; therefore, the author gives up control over the work’s physical
nature).
15
See id. at 365-66.
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his work once revealed.16 The scope of Moral Rights protection,
however, varies among legal regimes.17
B. General History
1. Impact of the Renaissance
Until the middle of the Renaissance, the Catholic Church and
wealthy patrons overarched artists’ creativity in Europe and
England.18 As the Church’s influence decreased, artistic innovation
and expression burgeoned.19 The expansion of artists’ creativity
fostered the momentum for the assertion of artists’ personal rights.20
Michelangelo, capitalizing upon his outstanding reputation, first
demanded the bundle of rights that now fall under the umbrella of
Moral Rights.21 In a sculpture commissioned for a chapel in St.
Peter’s Cathedral, Michelangelo, first asserting his right of
attribution, secretly chiseled his name into the sculpture after hearing
of the sculpture being falsely attributed to his patron.22 Later,
Michelangelo asserted his right of disclosure while finishing the
ceiling of the Sistine chapel, by refusing Pope Julius II access to the
unfinished murals.23

16

See id.
See generally Adolf Dietz, The Moral Rights of the Author: Moral Rights and the
Civil Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199 (1995) (discussing the scope of
Moral Rights in Europe); Gerald Dworkin, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights
and the Common Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 229 (1995) (presenting the
scope of Moral Rights in England and the United States).
18
See Swack, supra note 10, at 367 (citing Harold C. Streibich, The Moral Right of
Ownership to Intellectual Property: Part I – From the Beginning to the Age of Printing, 6
MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1975)).
19
See id.
20
See id.
21
See id.
22
See GIORGIO VASARI, THE LIVES OF THE PAINTERS, SCULPTORS AND ARCHITECTS (AB
Hinds ed. 1927).
23
See id.
17
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The vision behind the right of integrity can also be attributed to
Michelangelo.24 Under the patronage system, the artist executed the
patron’s idea.25 Michelangelo realized that artists’ integrity would be
perpetually violated until they were able to exercise creative control
over their works.26 Although fulfilling lucrative commissions,
Michelangelo leveraged his reputation by creating paintings to
satisfy his own creative instincts, knowing that his reputation would
afford him a buyer.27 Michelangelo fundamentally redefined the
patron-artist relationship by transforming the artist into the one
determining subject, style, and price.28
2. Invocation of Official Authors’ Rights
In the eighteenth century French authors adopted a natural law
conception of rights in their creations, protesting the royal printing
privileges.29 The French Revolution provided the impetus for
statutory recognition of the natural law theory of copyright, which
replaced the royal printing monopoly.30 The Revolutionary Laws of
January 13-19, 1791, codified inherent, exclusive rights of authors in
their works.31
Respect for the natural law basis of authors’ rights began to
diminish in the 1880s.32 Societal shifts created a disconnect between
24

See Swack, supra note 10, at 369.
See id.
26
See id.
27
See id.
28
See id.
29
See Boudewijn Bouckaert, What is Property?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 775, 791
(1990) (“The notion of artistic property appeared in France during the Eighteenth Century
with in the context of the struggle of authors against the system of royal privileges. Such
privileges were mostly granted by the king to publishing companies in Paris. Authors
claimed the right to sell their manuscripts to editors of their choice or even to edit and print
documents themselves. . . . This property right implied the right to sell their products to
whomever they wanted. These claims reflected the general aversion among Eighteenth
Century intellectuals to the royal control on intellectual production.”).
30
See SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY
AND ARTISTIC WORKS 1886-1986, at 5-6 (1987).
31
See id.
32
See id.
25
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the public and intellectuals.33 In addition, many rejected the natural
law analogy, asserting that it diminished the presence of individual
personality within a work.34 To reinvigorate the respect for and basis
of author’s rights, French jurists turned to the theories of inalienable
personality and alienable property, delineated in the writings of the
German philosophers Kant and Hegel.35
3. Influence of the Germans upon Modern Moral Rights
An author’s creation, according to Kant, is a manifestation of the
individual’s will.36 The rights that an author maintains in his works
according to Kant, then, are personality rather than property rights.37
In Kant’s worldview, a bright line exists between the tangible
material elements of an author’s work and the expression inherent
within the work; essentially, the inherent personal expression
dominates the material component of the work.38 In contrast to
property, which is a means of exchanging value, an author’s creation
is a means of exchanging thought.39 Within Kant’s theory rests the
notion that personality rights are a derivative of every man’s
inalienable right to express and communicate his ideas.40 Hegel
asserts that the development of personality occurs through the
“externalization of its will,” thereby allowing property to be deemed
an expression of self.41
In the late nineteenth century three German philosophers built
upon the theories of Kant and Hegel, creating the theoretical basis for
33

See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy
in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 26
(1994).
34
See id. at 16.
35
See id. at 17-20.
36
See Swack, supra note 10, at 371-72 (quoting Was is ein Buch, where Kant states that
an author’s vision is an action, an exertion of the [artist’s] will, rather than an external
thing).
37
See id.
38
See id.
39
See id.
40
See id.
41
See Swack, supra note 10, at 371.
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the modern doctrine of Moral Rights.42 Karl Gareis, a Kantian,
reinvigorated the concept of personality rights toward the latter half
of the nineteenth century. Personality rights, according to Gareis,
were comprised of the personality itself.43
Otto Friedrick von Gierke, elaborating upon Kantian philosophy,
asserted that personality rights were separate, distinct, and superior
to author’s rights.44 Personality rights protect the author and all
concrete manifestations of the author’s will, while author’s rights
concern only the economic exploitation of the artistic property.45
Therefore, in von Gierke’s worldview, aspects of a creative work
expressing the artist’s personality should dominate the financial
interests of the work.
John Kohler, a follower of Hegel, developed the dualist theory of
authors’ rights at the start of the twentieth century.46 The dualist
theory asserts that artists maintain both personality and economic
interests in their works; however, each area is protected under
separate bundles of legal rights.47 Through the creative process an
artist transmits a piece of herself into the work, thereby also allowing
her to economically exploit the monetary value created by this
manifestation of the artist’s personality.48 Kohler, in accord with von
Gierke, emphasized that an artistic work is predominantly a
reflection of the artist and that the personality rights, therefore, must
take precedence over the economic components.49
Modern French copyright law, in particular, the French droit
d’auteur in article 2 of the French Act, is a reflection of the dualist
theory.50 Under the French Act the author receives exclusive rights
42

See id.
See id.
44
See Barbara Friedman, From Deontology to Dialogue: The Cultural Consequences of
Copyright, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157, 167 (1994).
45
See id.
46
See Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy
of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 841-42 (1990).
47
See id.
48
See id.
49
See id.
50
See Loi du 11 Mars 1957 Sur la Propriete Litteraire et Artistique, arts. 26-28, 1957
J.O. 2733, 1957 D.L. 102 (Fr.) [hereinafter French Act] (translated in UNESCO, 1
43
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in his or her creation, which are divided into economic and Moral
Rights.51 The split of droit d’auteur can be deemed dualist due to the
differing status accorded to economic and Moral Rights.52 Economic
rights are of a limited duration and are assignable.53 In contrast,
Moral Rights are infinite in duration, imprescriptible, and
inalienable.54 The power of moral over economic rights, however, is
not weaker because of this split.55 In reality, and in contrast to the
U.S., Moral Rights exert an inextricable force upon the economic
nature of a work, restricting the extent of ownership in an intellectual
work by someone other than the author.56
4. Initial Applications of Moral Rights
The French courts were the first to accept Moral Rights as a valid
legal term of art.57 In 1878 a prominent French jurist, Andre
Morillot, invoked the phrase Moral Rights in the case of Cinquin c.
Lecocq before the Cour de Cassation, France’s highest court.58 The
issue in Cinquin c. Lecocq was whether or not property rights of a
copyright were community property between spouses.59 Despite
answering the question affirmatively, the court allowed the artisthusband to “retain his right to change the works or even ‘suppress’
them.”60
The concept of author’s rights upon which Morillot based his idea
is rooted in the dualist system of protection espoused by Hegel and
developed by Kohler.61 Morillot’s invocation of Moral Rights
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATISES OF THE WORLD (1987)).
51
See Netanel, supra note 33, at 23.
52
See id.
53
See French Act, supra note 50, art. 30.
54
See French Act, supra note 50, art. 6., para. 2.
55
See Netanel, supra note 33, at 23.
56
See id.
57
See Swack, supra note 10, at 372.
58
See Judgment de 25 Juin 1902 (Cinquin C. Lecocq), Civ., 1903 Recueil Periodique
Siery [D.P.] 1.5.
59
See William Strauss, Moral Rights of the Author, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 506, 513 n.31
(1955).
60
See id.
61
See Edward Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common Law Basis for the
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provided the author “complete personal sovereignty,” while
opposing “all publication against the will of the author, all
publication under a name other than the true creator, and all vicious
and inexact reproduction.”62 Further, Morillot’s system granted the
right of economic exploitation exclusively to the author.63
Following this initial acknowledgement of Moral Rights in
Cinquin c. Lecocq, the French Bar argued over whether to adopt
Kant’s monist system in lieu of Hegel’s dualist system, under which
Cinquin c. Lecocq was argued.64 Under the Monists’ system authors’
rights are non-specific personality rights.65 In contrast, Dualists
perceived authors’ rights as two distinct rights: the right to
economically exploit one’s creative property and the
acknowledgment that an author’s work is a direct manifestation of
his or her personality.66 The French jurists chose Dualism, as the
two elements provided a clearer, more tangible legal test.67 Dualism
provided the French courts with a means of resolving disputes
regarding authors’ rights by a transparent inductive process.68 Other
European systems chose to guard authors’ rights through a more
opaque deductive process.69
5. Article 6bis of The Berne Convention
The Moral Rights provision of article 6bis of the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
(hereinafter “Article 6bis”) was adopted at the Rome Convention of
1928.70 Article 6bis encompasses both the right of attribution and
Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 29 (1988).
62
See id.
63
See id.
64
See Swack, supra note 10, at 373.
65
See id.
66
See id.
67
See Damich, supra note 61, at 31.
68
See id.
69
The German legal system follows the Kantian monist view of authors’ rights. The
deontelogical influenced German legal regime chose to philosophically justify a general
personality right and the derivative rights through a deductive process in contrast to the
French system, which affirmatively protects authors’ rights. See id at 30-31.
70
See International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
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the right of integrity.71 The right of attribution defined by Article
6bis as “the right to claim authorship of the work.”72 This broad
wording encompasses the right to have a work published
anonymously or under a pseudonym, to prevent false attribution, and
the right to prevent the author’s name from being applied to the work
of another person.73 Specifically, Article 6bis states:
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even
after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have
the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to
any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or
another derogatory action in relation to, the said work,
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.74
Technically, then, all signatories of the Berne Convention must
recognize artists’ Moral Rights.
The United States would not join the Berne Convention for
approximately a century. In 1988, however, the United States
became a signatory of the Berne Convention, on a conditional basis,
through the Berne Implementation Act.75 Congress did not include
new provisions recognizing moral Moral Rights in the Berne
Implementation Act. Rather, Congress asserted that American law
Proceedings of the Conference Held at Rome from May 7 to June 2 1928, Vol. 1 at 106-07,
Vol. 2 at 173-82, 200-04 (Pierre Tisseyre trans., 1929) [hereinafter Rome Conference].
71
See RICKETSON, supra note 30, at 455, 467-69.
72
See id.
73
See Final Report on the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne
Convention, 10 COL.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 514 (1986).
74
See RICKETSON, supra note 30, at 455 (citing the first section of article 6bis of the
Paris Act of the Berne Convention).
75
The Berne Implementation Act [hereinafter “the Act”] dictates the execution of the
Berne Convention, and holds that the domestic law will overarch US obligations under the
Berne Convention. Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2(1), (2) 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). In particular, §
3(b) of the Act clearly rejects Moral Rights:
The provisions of the Berne Convention, the adherence of the US thereto, and the
satisfaction of US obligations there under, do not expand or reduce any right of an
author of a work, whether claimed under Federal, State, or common law—to claim
authorship of the work; or to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the work, that would
prejudice the author’s honor or reputation.
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already protected authors’ Moral Rights adequately through the areas
of unfair competition, copyright, contract, defamation, and privacy.76
In addition, American federal courts refuse to allow Article 6bis to
provide a cause of action for Moral Rights violations.77 Thus, the
U.S. joined the Berne Convention to ease international criticism,
while bowing to domestic pressure by avoiding direct protection of
Moral Rights through a recycled argument of indirect protection.78
III. MORAL RIGHTS PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Background
Copyright law in the U.S. is a reflection of a utilitarian tradition.79
In contrast, Continental copyright law is a derivative of natural rights
and German idealism.80 Social utility is the driving force behind
American copyright law.81 In the tradition of American utilitarian
76

Existing and parallel American laws, according to the House of Representatives,
already provided protection for Moral Rights:
There is a composite of laws in this country that provides the kind of protection
envisioned by Article 6bis. Federal laws include 17 U.S.C. §106, relating to
derivative works; 17 U.S.C. §115(a)(2), relating to distortions of musical works
used under the compulsory license respecting sound recording; 17 U.S.C §203,
relating to termination of transfers and licenses; and section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, relating to false designations of origin and false descriptions. State and local
laws include those relating to publicity, contractual violations, fraud and
misrepresentation, unfair competition, defamation, and invasion of privacy. In
addition, eight states have recently enacted specific statutes protecting the right of
integrity and paternity in certain works of art. Finally, some courts have
recognized the equivalent of such rights. See H.R. REP. NO. 609, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 32-34 (1988).
77
See Choe v. Fordham University School of Law, 920 F. Supp. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (holding that the “Convention itself, as adopted, does not create federal common law
action for violation of author’s moral rights (citing to MELVILLE & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT section 8D.02[D], 8d-15-30 (1994)).
78
See Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists,
Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 569 (1940).
79
See Netanel, supra note 33, at 9 n.29.
80
See discussion supra Part II.
81
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“the
limited monopoly . . . should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public
appropriate access to their work product”).
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liberalism, authors’ rights are deemed to be “monopoly privileges”
and are granted only to advance the public welfare by providing
incentive for creativity, the product of which will be widely
available.82 Specifically, the United States Constitution states that:
“Congress shall have the Power . . . to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”83 As a result, copyright law in the U.S. functions as a
tool for the public interest rather than a guaranteed right arising out
of creation.84
The level and type of protection afforded to creative works by U.S.
law is a reflection of its market-dominated political economy.85 In
Continental legal systems, intellectual and creative works are
manifestations of the culture.86 Conversely, the same works in the
United States are another commodity for the market.87 The social
utility of a creative work is not measured by its contribution to
society or its novelty; rather, the social utility of the work and its
value to the author derives primarily from the price that the public is
willing to pay for the work.88 The greatest proponent of the free
market, Adam Smith, praised the monopoly for authors under the
Statute of Anne. Smith asserted that: “[I]f the book be a valuable
one the demand for it in [the copyright period] will probably be a
considerable addition to the [the author’s] fortune. But if it is of no
value the advantage he can reap for it will be very small.”89 Until
recently, then, American copyright sought solely to maximize
economic incentives for production and reduce incentives such as
82

See id.
U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 8. This section of the U.S. constitution is often referred to
as the Copyright Clause or the Intellectual Property Clause.
84
The conception of copyright as a means of serving the public good is clearly
articulated in the enabling clause of the United States Constitution art. I., § 8, cl. 8.
85
See Netanel, supra note 33, at 11. “The Utilitarian model of economic incentive to
stimulate author production and publisher dissemination presupposes a private-property
based milieu in which authors’ and publishers’ rewards are determined in the marketplace.”
86
See RICKETSON, supra note 30, at 5-6.
87
See Netanel, supra note 33, at 12.
88
See id.
89
See Netanel, supra note 33, at 13 quoting Adam Smith, Lecture on Jurisprudence 83
(R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael, P.G. Stein eds., Glasgow ed. 1978).
83
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prestige and creative desire; more specifically, American copyright
law sought market efficiency not protection of authors’ rights.90
Moral Rights are not being explicitly protected for the author; rather,
Moral Rights are being protected for the benefit of the market. In
light of this tradition, it is evident why Moral Rights conflict with the
market-dominated culture of U.S. law.
B. VARA
Two years after signing onto the Berne Convention, Congress
softened its prohibition of explicit Moral Rights protection. In 1994
Congress codified the Visual Artists Rights Act (hereinafter
“VARA”),91 which grants a bundle of Moral Rights to a limited
group of visual artists.92 Unfortunately, though, VARA narrowly
defines “work of visual art,” and therefore is invoked only in very
limited circumstances.93

90

See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325, 327-28 (1989) (stating that works will be created “only if the
difference between expected revenues and the cost of making copies equals or exceeds the
cost of expression”).
91
Visual Artists Rights Act [hereinafter VARA], Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, 104 Stat.
5128 (1990)) (codified in part in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501, 506
(1994)).
92
VARA states that creative artists:
(1) shall have the right (A) to claim authorship of that work, and (B) to prevent the
use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did
not create; (2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the
author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation; and (3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), shall have
the right—(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work
is a violation of that right, and (B) to prevent any destruction of a work of
recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that
work is a violation of that right.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
93
To date, limited VARA claims are on record. See English v. BFC & R East 11th
Street LLC, No. 97 Civ. 7446, 1997 WL 746444 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3. 1997), aff’d, 198 F.3d
233 (2d. Cir. 1999); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995); Pavia v.
1120 Avenue of the Americas Associates, 901 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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C. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
1. Definitions and Origins
The Lanham Act serves to combat false advertising and the
inappropriate use of trademarks.94 The purpose of the Lanham Act is
to aid consumers by preventing a marketplace of unfair
competition.95
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (hereinafter “§ 43(a)”) prohibits
the utilization of incorrect statements in regards to the origin,
description, or patronage of a product.96 Essentially § 43(a)
intervenes against action that could lead to consumer confusion.97
Section 43(a) serves the consumer by guarding against
misinformation streaming into the market, allowing the consumer to
benefit from the market’s natural, spontaneous order.98 The first to
benefit from § 43(a), however, are players and producers in the
marketplace.99 A competitor, for example, may sue under § 43(a) to
94

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), amended by Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (amending §§ 1052 and 1127).
95
See Diana Elzey Pinover, The Rights of Authors, Artists, and Performers Under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 38, 45 (1993) (referring to 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), amended by Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No.
103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)).
96
15 USC § 1125(a) (1992). It states:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which – is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person, or in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action
by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such an
act.
97
See Randolph Stuart Sergent, Building Reputational Capital: The Right of Attribution
under Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 45 (1995).
98
See id.
99
See id.
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prevent false advertising by the defendant.100 Therefore, although
consumers are the ultimate beneficiaries of § 43(a), producers of
goods and services in the marketplace are generally the first parties
to invoke § 43(a).101 In recent years, authors have invoked § 43(a) to
protect their rights of attribution and integrity.102
2. Reverse Passing Off: Right of Attribution under § 43(a)
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, as stated above, regulates two
types of activities: 1) false advertising; and 2) the “passing off” of
goods under a competitor’s trademark.103 Courts invoke the phrase
“passing off” in three distinct situations: 1) trademark infringement
without intent to defraud, but where consumers were likely to be
confused; 2) trademark infringement with intent to defraud and
confuse buyers; and 3) substitution of one brand of goods when
another brand is ordered.104 Overall, though, the main issue concerns
whether or not the consumer will confuse the two products.
Section 43(a) is also invoked in many federal circuits to combat
practices that are the economic equivalent of “passing off.”
Essentially, § 43(a) protects the market from misinformation that
could distort its natural, spontaneous order.105 Included in these acts
would be “reverse passing off,” which occurs when the party at fault
100

See id.
Compare Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir.
1971) (“Congress’ purpose in enacting §43(a) was to create a special and limited unfair
competition remedy, virtually without regard for the interests of consumers generally.”),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) with Sergent, supra note 97, at 46 n.5 (“When a court
expands the Lanham’s Act’s scope by providing new definitions of ‘unfair’ practices, the
ultimate interests of consumers should be the baseline against which to measure whether a
producer should be given a ‘right’ under § 43(a). Producers are often ‘harmed’ by
legitimate competition, and if the sole focus of the Lanham Act causes of action is upon the
producer, the Lanham Act can easily become a tool for reducing or eliminating competition,
to the consumer’s ultimate detriment.”).
102
See Pinover, supra note 95, at 38; see also Marie v. Driscoll, The “New” 43(a), 79
TRADEMARK REP. 238 (1989).
103
See discussion supra Part III(c)(i).
104
See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25.01(1), at
25-3 (1994).
105
See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1981).
101

FRMT6.SUHL

1218

6/23/02 4:26 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 12

sells another party’s creation or product as his or her own.106
Reverse passing off takes shape in two different forms. Implied
reverse passing off occurs when the defendant removes the source
name of a product and sells it in a generic form.107 Express reverse
passing off takes place when the defendant removes another’s name
or trademark and then proceeds to sell the product under his or her
own chosen name or mark.108
Courts often interpret the prohibition against “reverse passing off”
in § 43(a) as providing authors with a legitimate right to seek proper
credit for their work.109 Two justifications exist for this contention:
1) if authors do not receive proper credit, consumer confusion will
result because the consumer will be unaware of the true source of the
work; and 2) without proper credit, the author’s reputation would not
be enhanced commensurate with the creation.110 It is supposed, then,
that the author will likely be denied future opportunities if her
reputation does not accurately reflect her work.
Authors seek remedy under reverse passing off for claims
regarding their right of attribution under the Lanham Act. The 1981
Ninth Circuit decision of Smith v. Montoro is the leading case on this
issue.111 Case law following Smith provides authors and other
creators with the right of attribution. Although the right of
attribution is a type of reverse passing off claim, it is not
conceptually interchangeable with a standard reverse passing off case
dealing with a manufactured product or a trademark.112 Right of
attribution claims are more complex, encompassing claims exceeding
the creator’s physical product.113 A creator asserts the right of

106

See id.
See id.
108
See id.
109
See Sergent, supra note 97, at 46.
110
See id.
111
See 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that an actor maintained standing to sue a
distributor under § 43(a) because the distributor credited the actor’s work to someone else in
the credits).
112
See MCCARTHY, supra note 104, § 25.01(4)(b), at 25-10.
113
See Sergent, supra note 97, at 51-52
107
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attribution when he or she should receive credit for the defendant’s
products.114
3. Demonstrating a Successful § 43(a) Claim
A successful claim for the right of attribution under section 43(a)
must satisfy three requirements. First, to gain jurisdiction, the goods
and services in question must be involved in interstate commerce.115
Second, one must successfully prove standing to sue under the
Lanham Act.116 Standing is achieved when the plaintiff proves either
a competitive or commercial injury, which maintains a causal link to
misleading information. Third, the plaintiff must have a genuine
interest protected by the act.117
4. Protected Interests of a § 43(a) Right of Attribution Claim
An author’s claim for the right of attribution under § 43(a) cannot
be solely based upon a false designation of authorship; rather, the
central claim must be based upon a claim of actual confusion.118

114

See id.
See Sims v. Blanchris, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (plaintiff denied
standing as defendant never entered goods into an interstate stream of commerce).
116
See MCCARTHY, supra note 104, § 27.03(3)(a) (stating that “although both the preand post-1988 versions of section 43(a) give standing to ‘any person who believes that he is
or is likely to be damaged,’ courts have not given this provision its full literal scope . . .
although most courts now agree that direct competition with the wrongdoer is not
necessary.”).
117
See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1108 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 1080 (1993).
118
See Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1988) (Only
one of three songwriters was given proper credit. The Ninth Circuit held that “[had] the
defendants decided to attribute authorship to a fictitious person . . . this would be a ‘false’
designation of origin. It seems to us no less false to attribute authorship to only one of
several co-authors.”).
115
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5. Protected Interests v. Industry Custom
The standard for determining when an interest is protected under §
43(a) is not clearly defined by the courts.119 As § 43(a) claims are
designed to remedy false attribution, courts generally ignore
substantive law and industry custom when deciding claims under this
section.120 For instance, where an editor designated herself the
principal author in accordance with industry custom, a court still
found it misleading.121
D. Limitation of Right of Attribution Claims
The remedies invoked under § 43(a) must correlate with the
overall purpose of the Lanham Act.122 As noted above, reverse
passing off cases require that the harm is the product of: 1) the
original creator’s loss of future earning potential because the creation
is being sold under another name, and 2) consumer confusion arising
from the inability to decipher the correct origin of the product.123
1. Likelihood of Confusion
A likelihood of confusion exists where the plaintiff is likely to
assume that the creation in question originated with the defendant,
when the plaintiff can actually claim a right of attribution.124 A two119

See Sergent, supra note 97, at 58.
See id. (asserting that the “rationale for ignoring other substantive law or industry
custom is that §43(a) focuses upon false representations, rather than vindication of property
rights.”).
121
See Follett v. New American Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(holding that industry practices were not pertinent to the case because even if the industry
practices were to grant attribution rights to the editor, it would still violate the Lanham Act
if original author’s contribution was misrepresented).
122
See Sergent, supra note 97, at 62 (referring to Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus.,
832 F.2d 1325, 1329 (2d Cir. 1987)).
123
See Smith, 648 F.2d at 607.
124
“[A] likelihood of confusion should always exist whenever the plaintiff can show a
right of attribution for the defendant’s product and consumers do not know that the plaintiff
120
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prong test is utilized to determine if a valid right of attribution claim
exists: 1) a comparison of the two products should be made by the
court, to determine whether or not the defendant is actually selling
the plaintiff’s product125; and 2) If the court makes an affirmative
finding in part one, then it should determine if consumers are
confused about the source of the product.126 Significantly, however,
the sophistication of the consumer will be taken into account in order
to determine if the consumer actually knew of the source.127
2. Actual Confusion
Actual confusion is shown by a lost future opportunity.128 The
plaintiff, then, in a reverse passing off case, must show that he or she
lost future opportunities that would have been available if correct and
sufficient recognition was given for the creation.129 If, however, that
cannot be proved, then actual consumer confusion must be proved.130
In a reverse passing off case, actual consumer confusion occurs when
the consumers actually believed the defendant to be the originator of
the creation in question.131
E. Right of Integrity
1. Defined
The Right of Integrity involves the mutilation of an artist’s work,
which is defined as substantially changing a creation without the
created the products that the defendant is selling.” See Sergent, supra note 97, at 63.
125
See id.
126
See id. at 63-64.
127
See Rosenfeld v. W.B. Saunders, 728 F. Supp. 236, (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the
sophisticated nature of the buyers, medical professionals, allowed them to be informed that
medical treatises are a compilation of prior works. Therefore, the court found that there was
not a likelihood of actual confusion).
128
See Sergent, supra note 97, at 65.
129
See id.
130
See id.
131
See id.
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author’s permission.132 Injury occurs because the author is given
credit for a work that does not include his final authorization.133
2. Continental Protection of Integrity
The Right of Integrity is the central component of Moral Rights
protection in France.134 Negatively, the right provides the author
with entitlement to prevent any public presentation of the work that
threatens his or her reputation.135 The French case involving the
artist Bernard Buffet is often cited as an example of the French
Court’s respect for and acknowledgement of the negative rights
inherent in the Right of Integrity.136 Another legitimate invocation of
the negative right associated with the Right of Integrity is to combat
an adaptation that does not truthfully represent the work.137 An
additional invocation of the negative right is justified when a public
display of a work is detrimental to the work’s overall conceptual
view.138 The leading case regarding this third invocation concerned
the music of Dmitri Shostakovich in an anti-Soviet film without
Shostakovich’s permission.139 Only a French court found in favor of
the musician.140 The French case Dubuffet c. Renault exemplifies the
132

See Roeder, supra note 78, at 566.
See Pinover, supra note 95, at 45.
134
See Codified in Article 6 of Loi du 11 mars 1957 Sur la Propiete Litteraire et
Artsitique, arts.26-28, 1957 J.O. 2733, 1957 D.L. 102 (Fr.), stating that “the author shall
enjoy . . . respect for his name, his authorship, and his work.”
135
See Netanel, supra note 33, at 38.
136
See Judgment of May 30, 1962 (Fersing v. Buffet), Cour de Cassation, 1965 G.P. 126
(Buffet had painted designs on a refrigerator, which the owner sought to dismantle and sell
as individual pieces. Buffet sued to prevent the refrigerator’s dismantling and asserted that
the refrigerator was an artistic whole. The cour de cassation ruled that the public display of
Buffet’s work in the mutilated form would violate the artist’s personal right in regards to his
creation, but that the separate pieces could be kept in the owners home.). See generally
John H. Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023 (1976).
137
See Bernard Rousseau v. Galeries Lafayette, Judgment of Mar. 13, 1973, Trib. Gr.
Inst. 1974 J.C.P., No. 48, at 224; see also Damich, supra note 61, at 22.
138
See Damich, supra note 61, at 23.
139
See Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 87 N.Y.S. 2d 430 (1st Dep’t
1949) (New York court rejected claim that the unauthorized use of the musician’s pieces in
a film about soviet espionage in Canada, falsely imbued disloyalty to his country).
140
See Soc. Le Chant de Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe et Soc. Fox Americain Twentieth
Century, Judgement of Jan. 13, 1953, 1953 G.P. 191.
133
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positive right of integrity; more specifically, when an author can
demand public presentation of a work.141 In this case the artist was
commissioned to design a sculpture for Renault, but the company
defaulted due to financial problems. The Cour de Cassation ordered
Renault to finish the sculpture, implicitly asserting that the artist was
entitled to the preservation of his creation, which in this case meant
its presentation in tangible form.142 The author in France, and in
many other Continental regimes, maintains a personal connection
with his or her creation that extends beyond the author’s reputation
interests; essentially, the author is allowed to intervene whenever he
or she feels that a modification to a given work may affect the
public’s judgment of the author.143
3. Gilliam v. ABC: Where It Started
Under § 43(a), an author may assert his or her right of integrity
when his or her work is altered without permission.144 The leading
case regarding this issue is Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co.,145
which held that ABC’s broadcasting of a highly edited version of
Monty Python skits violated § 43(a). In Gilliam, the court found that
ABC’s unauthorized editing substantially changed the skits, allowing
the public to associate the new skits as Monty Python’s original
creation.146 Essentially, the court asserted that the presentation of the
141
See Judgment of Mar. 23, 1977, Trib. Gr. Inst., 1977 R.I.D.A. 191 obs. Desbois (Fr.),
aff’d, Judgment of June 2, 1978, 1980 G.P. 580 note Franck, rev’d, Judgment of Jan. 8,
1980, Cass. Civ. 1re, 1980 J.C.P. II no. 1933 note Lindon.
142
See Netanel, supra note 33, at 39. See generally Andre Francon & Jane Ginsburg,
Authors Rights in France: The Moral Right of the Creator of a Commissioned Work to
Compel the Commissioning Party to Complete the Work, 9 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 381
(1985).
143
See Netanel, supra note 33, at 39 (referring to Delorme v. Catena-France, Judgment
December 12, 1988, Cours d/appel, P.I.B.D. III, NO. 454, at 231, 10 EUROPEAN INTELL.
PROP. REV. D-182 (1989) where a company logo that the designer created was modified
without his authorization, the court granted the right of integrity to the designer, even
though the changes only consisted in the positioning of the logo)).
144
“This statute . . . has been . . . invoked to prevent misrepresentations that may injure
plaintiff’s business or personal reputation, even where no registered trademark is
concerned.” See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Corp., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
145
See id.
146
See id.
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mutilated Monty Python skit violated the right of the artist to have
the work attributed to him in the form in which he created it.147
4. Gilliam Applied
While Gilliam is a landmark on the map of integrity protection in
the U.S., it is an anomaly.148 The Gilliam holding is problematic as
precedent because the facts are so unique and represent a clear case
of mutilation; therefore, many courts who are not inclined to protect
the right to integrity will distinguish the facts of Gilliam.149
In the music industry, § 43(a), as applied in Gilliam, is invoked to
protect the older recordings of musicians from being altered and then
presented to the public as new albums without permission.150 One
case, Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp.,151 involves the
remixing of an older artist’s album, where the new version included
sexually explicit lyrics and an erotically renamed cover 152 Although
the defendant created the derivative works and owned copyright in
the old album, the Southern District of New York still found that
such unorthodox alterations violated § 43(a).153 Like Gilliam,
though, this case is overt and extreme.

147
See id. (court held that “to deform [the author’s] work is to present [an author] to the
public as the creator of a work not his own, and thus makes him subject to criticism for
work he has not done.”).
148
Gilliam has yet to be followed.
149
See generally Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2000); Marvullo
v. Gruner & Jahr, 105 F. Supp. 2d 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
150
See Raphael Winick, Intellectual Property, Defamation and the Digital Alteration of
Visual Images, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 143, 172 (1997).
151
452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Defendants remixed one of plaintiff’s older
recording sessions and marketed the material as “George Benson, Erotic Moods.” Record
jacket featured “X-Rated LP” caption, and sexually suggestive moaning was added to one
selection.).
152
See id.
153
See id.
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5. The Limits of Gilliam as Precedent for Integrity Protection
Although Gilliam does represent a standard for protecting the right
to integrity via the Lanham Act, it does not necessarily provide a true
remedy because of the onerous standard required for a successful
claim. To successfully bring a Lanham Act claim for damages, the
plaintiff must prove either actual consumer confusion or deception in
addition to the violation of integrity, where the defendant’s actions
were not intentionally deceptive.154 Although this standard was
easily met by the facts of Gilliam, it is rare to find a case where the
facts will present an irrefutable claim of consumer confusion.
Gilliam and its descendants represent an expansive reading of §
43(a) asserting that that the Lanham Act’s purpose is not only to
protect the public and artist from misrepresentations, but also to
enforce the author’s “personal right” to reject public viewings of his
or her work in a mutilated or distorted form.155 Many courts,
however, view this interpretation of the Lanham Act as an illicit
substitute, or ‘back-door,’ for Moral Rights protection.156 In fact, the
majority of recent cases regarding this issue reject the broad
interpretation of § 43(a) championed in Gilliam.
6. Why Gilliam Is Likely to Stand Alone
In the 1995 Southern District of New York case of Choe v.
Fordham University School of Law,157 the court also struck down the
plaintiff’s claim for Moral Rights relief under § 43(a).158 The
plaintiff submitted a comment to the Fordham International Law
154

See George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d Cir. 1992).
See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24.
156
See Judge Gurfein’s concurrence in Gilliam, asserting that section 43(a) should not be
invoked as a moral rights substitute because “the Lanham Act does not deal with artistic
integrity. It only goes to misdescription of origin and the like.” Although not dissenting
from Judge Lumbard’s application of section 43(a) to the facts of Gilliam in the majority
opinion, Judge Gurfein stated that it would have been more prudent to invoke available
contractual and copyright remedies. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 26-27.
157
920 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
158
See id.
155
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Journal, and claimed that the printed version represented a mutilated
form of his comment due to the editorial changes.159 The court did
not overrule Gilliam; rather, it distinguished it and emphasized that
in this case the plaintiff did not provide evidence to support a claim
that the changes sufficiently changed the meaning of the piece so as
to provide the reader with a different meaning of Choe’s work.160 Of
greater significance, however, is that the court explicitly struck down
the validity of an Article 6bis claim for Moral Rights due to lack of
federal jurisdiction.161 The Choe decision, thus, is representative of
the rejection by American courts of the explicit Moral Rights
protection offered under Article 6bis and a reliance upon the weak
protection afforded under the Berne Implementation Act.162
Furthermore, the attitude exhibited by the Choe court indicates that
the overt protection of Moral Rights in Gilliam is not likely to be
emulated in other decisions.163
7. Comparative Weakness of Integrity Protection
The weaknesses and limits of author’s integrity protection under
U.S. law relative to Continental law is highlighted by a case
involving Turner Entertainment’s colorization of the black and white
film, Asphalt Jungle.164 The heirs of the film’s director protested the
colorization of the film.165 Under U.S. law, colorization creates a
derivative work conditioned upon the will of the copyright owner’s
exclusive derivative right.166 In this case, though, the heirs did not
maintain a successful cause of action for U.S. courts, particularly
because standard film contracts force the director to sign away all
159

See id. at 45.
See id. at 48.
161
See id. at 49.
162
See id.
163
See id. (“Whatever language there may be in . . . Gilliam to suggest a federal common
law claim for deprivation of an author’s “moral rights” is dictum, and has not generated any
claim in this Circuit for almost 20 years.).
164
See Judgment of May 28, 1991, Cass. Civ. 1re, 149 r.i.d.a. 197 (1991); see also
Ginsburg & Sirinelli, Auteur, Creation et Adaptation en Droit International Prive et Droit
Iterne Francais. Reflexions a Partir de l’Affaire Huston, 150 R.I.D.A. 2 (1991).
165
See Judgment of May 28, 1991, supra note 164.
166
See Netanel, supra note 33, at 44.
160
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rights to the producer.167 The director’s heirs, though, filed suit in
France to prevent a French television station from broadcasting the
colorized version, asserting that it would violate the director’s Right
of Integrity.168 In its analysis, the Cour de Cassation refused to
apply U.S. Copyright law, and ruled under French law that the
director’s creative contribution to a film makes him or her the
author.169 Under French law, therefore, the director as author
maintains his Moral Right of Integrity even after the industry’s
standard assignment of rights.170
The discrepancy between the outcomes in the Asphalt Jungle case
under U.S. and French law illustrates that U.S. copyright law is
dominated by economic interests, consistent with U.S. legal
tradition.171 While successful causes of action for Moral Rights
protection under § 43(a) do exist in the cases discussed earlier, those
represent specific causes of action that fall nicely under the rubric of
unfair competition.172 Moral Rights are not being explicitly
protected; rather, Moral Rights are being protected for the benefit of
the market and not the author. As the Asphalt Jungle case
demonstrates, the United States does not afford an author a clear or
consistent means of creative protection.
CONCLUSION
Moral Rights protection is limited in the United States, where the
only viable course of action for non-visual authors is through the
Lanham Act. Regarding both the Right of Attribution and the Right
of Integrity, the Lanham Act provides only limited protection. The
prevention of consumer deception in the market, not the overt
protection of an author’s creativity, is the purpose of the Lanham
167

See id.
See id.
169
See Judgment of May 28, 1991, supra note 164.
170
See Netanel, supra note 33, at n.225 (stating that “Even under French law . . . the
director’s exploitation rights are presumptively transferred to the producer. But the director
maintains certain moral rights despite the transfer.”).
171
See Netanel, supra note 33, at 28.
172
See id.
168
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Act. Thus, authors garner protection only where overt mutilations
occur to the extent that the character of the work is changed so as to
present a false designation of origin. Mutilation of a work, therefore,
which does not confuse the public’s view of its origin, would not be
actionable under the Lanham Act. As the Asphalt Jungle case
exemplifies, this protection is quite limited relative to that afforded
by other Berne Convention member countries.
Is the United States really meeting its obligations under the Berne
Convention, particularly in regards to Article 6bis? To truly comply
with the Berne Convention, it may be necessary for U.S. law to
depart from its utilitarian, market-driven tradition, and to
affirmatively provide protection to authors in a manner consistent
with that provided by other member countries of the Berne
Convention.

